Since Justice Brandeis' 1932 remark that in a federal system states can serve as "laboratories" of democracy, a widespread belief has held that political decentralization stimulates policy experimentation. We reexamine the political economy underlying this claim, using a model of retrospective voting and contrasting centralized and decentralized institutions. Although under some conditions (when experiments are politically promising) decentralization can result in greater experimentation, several effects combine to lead, under most conditions, to both more frequent and better organized policy experimentation under centralized government.
Introduction
Political decentralization is often thought to stimulate policy experimentation and innovation.
Justice Brandeis made this argument famous in 1932 with his remark that in a federal system states can serve as "laboratories" to test novel policies.
1 Ever since, the notion has been influential in American jurisprudence, with more than three dozen judges citing Brandeis' comment in their opinions (Greve 2001) . It has been used in the Supreme Court to defend letting states set policy on everything from physician-assisted suicide and medical marijuana to jury trial procedure and gun-free school zones. 2 The argument is also common in economics and political science. In his classic work on fiscal federalism, Wallace Oates suggested that one of the three main benefits of decentralization is that it may "result in greater experimentation and innovation in the production of public goods." 3 This paper reexamines the political economy behind this argument. Why might decentralization increase the frequency of policy experimentation? Some assume that in a centralized system, the government cannot differentiate its policies geographically (e.g. Strumpf 2002 ). Given this, in a country with 50 regions, a centralized government can conduct only one fiftieth as many experiments per period as regional governments acting autonomously. Brandeis seemed to have this in mind. Federalism, he wrote, permitted "courageous" states to experiment "without risk to the rest of the country," implying that in non-federal orders experiments would have to impose risks nationwide.
However, as many scholars have pointed out, centralized governments can implement different policies in different regions, and they do so all the time. 4 Even Stalin's totalitarian regime provided schooling in native languages in the 14 non-Russian Soviet republics (Bilinsky 1968) . Among democracies, the United Kingdom and France are considered among the most politically centralized. But both differentiate policies geographically in countless ways. The
British operate entire separate legal systems for England and Scotland. In France, even in the 1960s heyday of dirigisme, the national economic plan broke down into distinct and varied regional plans (MacLennan 1965) .
Local policy experiments occur in both centralized dictatorships and centralized democracies. In the Soviet Union, Brezhnev authorized economic experiments in particular regions, and extended successful ones to other areas. 5 Similar localized experiments occurred in China under both Mao and his successors. Among democracies, the UK central government frequently tests policies in selected local areas before "rolling them out" nationwide. One 2003 survey identified "well over 100" such pilot schemes conducted in the previous five years, and even worried that central authorities might run out of test sites. 6 Experiments examined the effectiveness of financial incentives to keep teenagers in school (in 15 local education authorities), aid to low-income workers (eight pilot areas), anti-smoking initiatives (26 health action zones), personal advisers to help poor single parents get jobs (eight local areas), schemes to improve the real estate market (in Bristol), and treatment and testing sentences for minor drug offenders (in Croydon, Gloucestershire, Liverpool, Glasgow, and Fife). 7 The locations for these experiments were selected to ensure appropriate controls or to examine how policies interacted with local conditions.
Clearly, localized policy experiments are possible under both centralized and decentralized orders. Whether they are more frequent under one than the other needs to be explained, therefore, in terms of the incentives these structures create for the relevant policymakers. Do centralized or decentralized systems motivate officials more strongly to experiment? We develop a model to study this question, focusing on democracies and assuming that citizens vote retrospectively. Risk-neutral, reelection-seeking incumbent official s decide whether to enact "experimental" or "status quo" policies. Experimental policies have payoffs that
are not known precisely before they are chosen for the first time; the payoff comes from a known distribution, and is revealed after the policy is enacted. Under "centralization", a nationally elected official chooses local policies for all units; under "decentralization", locally elected officials choose policies for their own units. As is standard in retrospective voting models, voters vote for the incumbent if their payoff is above a certain threshold. We derive the equilibrium number of local experiments conducted under each system, given different types of experiments with different distributions of payoffs.
We find that, although there are certain cases in which decentralization results in greater equilibrium innovation, some powerful effects pull in the opposite direction. One, which has been noted before, is the positive information externality effect. Because knowledge acquired through one local unit's experiments benefits others, uncoordinated local governments will tend to underinvest in policy experimentation. A central government will internalize such externalities.
Our model reveals two new effects, which follow from the different electoral logic for central and local incumbents-specifically, the fact that a central incumbent must win a majority nationwide, 7 See UK Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (2002), Eley et al. (2002 ), Jowell (2003 .
while each local incumbent must win in its own locality. Whereas the electoral fate of a local incumbent depends entirely on the outcome of policy in its unit, a central incumbent's probability of reelection is a more complicated function of the policy outcomes in all the local units. promising more experiments will be enacted under decentralization than centralization. Putting these together, we show that equilibrium innovation may be greater under decentralization than centralization when policy experiments are extremely politically promising, but that it will be greater under centralization in other cases.
We study several extensions. First, as the number of local units increases, the temptation for local governments to free-ride on others' experimentation under decentralization grows, while the risk-taking and risk-conserving effects under centralization push the central government toward experimenting in half the units. As a result, for a sufficiently large number of localities, centralized governments always experiment more than decentralized ones. Second, when policy 8 We assume for simplicity that the minimum scale for implementing a policy experiment corresponds to the local unit. This is not strictly necessary. All one needs is that the national jurisdiction could be divided into more non-overlapping test sites than each local jurisdiction.
experiments are correlated or heterogeneous, decentralization suffers from another kind of coordination failure: all local governments duplicate each other's efforts by choosing the same, most-promising experiment in a given round. By contrast, the central government will coordinate experimentation among local units to increase the chance of discovering successful policies.
Third, if policy experimentation imposes negative externalities on other localities, centralization-by internalizing these externalities-often leads to less experimentation.
However, preventing such uncompensated cost-exporting will often be desirable.
Several other effects do not fit into the model but are nevertheless important to the comparison. We discuss these at the end of the paper. We conclude that in most regards politically centralized governments have stronger incentives to experiment and greater capacity to coordinate experiments and rapidly exploit the knowledge they generate. If states are "policy laboratories", these laboratories will often be more innovative and better organized if their experiments are centrally authorized and coordinated.
Several previous papers have used formal modeling to explore the relationship between decentralization and experimentation. In a pioneering contribution, Susan Rose-Ackerman (1980) examined the extent of experimentation in decentralized systems. Like us, she found that experimentation by uncoordinated local governments can result in wasteful duplication or freeriding. Our approach differs from hers in that we explicitly model different political incentives to experiment under centralized and decentralized systems of electoral democracy, and contrast the equilibrium outcomes. We reproduce some effects noted by Rose-Ackerman, but identify a number of additional ones (e.g., the risk-taking and risk-conserving effects) and show how these may interact. Strumpf (2002) also identifies the informational externality effect. However, he assumes that central governments cannot enact different policies in different localities. As noted, we consider this unrealistic, and examine the logic that results if the assumption is abandoned.
Finally, Kollman, Miller and Page (2000) ii FS> . We assume for now-and relax this later-that each of the l possible experiments has the same probability of success, q, and the same payoffs for "success" and "failure" ( S and F respectively.) Thus, each experiment has the same expected value. We also assume for now-and relax the assumption later-that the outcomes of different experiments are independent. At the beginning of the second period, all localities observe the outcomes of all policy experiments conducted in the first period. Thus, if any successful experiment was implemented in the first period, all will implement a successful experiment in the second.
The voters vote retrospectively, responding to performance rather than to the policy choice. 9 At the end of the second period, the representative voter in each locality votes for the 9 Thus, policymakers are not given credit by the voters for choosing experiments that have a positive ex ante expected value but which in fact fail. Alternatively, one could model the voters' strategy as one of rewarding incumbents for picking the options with the highest ex ante expected value. However, assuming retrospective voting based on some broad measure of performance is more consistent with a view of voters as "rationally ignorant" about the details of policy, and seems closer to the stylized facts of actual voting in countries such as the US. Such models were first developed by Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986) , and inform the extensive literature on political business cycles (Alesina et al. 1997) . Empirical studies since Kramer (1971) and Fair (1978) , u is some predetermined threshold, and 0 δ > is a weight representing the extent to which the voter focuses on the recent past relative to the more distant past. Thus, δ might represent a discount factor (think of the voters pledging at the beginning of period 1 to reelect the incumbent if and only if she provides them a certain level of utility during her term of office; from the perspective of the start of the term, voters might discount utility experienced toward the end of the term.) If we think of voters deciding how to vote only at the time of election, it is psychologically plausible that they would give greater weight to the recent past ( 1 δ > ). Considerable empirical evidence suggests that US voters vote retrospectively in presidential elections, focusing on economic performance in the last few quarters before the ballot. Such a focus can also be rationalized as in Rogoff (1990) . If one period lasts longer than the other, this could also be captured in δ . So the representative voter's total payoff is: zero if policy A is implemented in both periods, (1) S δ + if successful experiments are implemented in both periods,
period and a failed experiment in the second period, and so on.
By the assumptions of retrospective voting, the probability that voters in a given locality vote for the incumbent must be non-decreasing in the representative voter's payoff. For simplicity, we assume that voters vote against the incumbent if their total payoff in the two periods is strictly less than zero, 12 0 uuu δ +<=. So implementing failed experiments in both periods , or a failed experiment in one period and policy A in another, results in rejection of the incumbent by voters in the relevant locality. We also assume that the voters vote for the incumbent for sure if the policy is E in both periods and the experiment succeeds, that is if
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(1) uuS δδ +=+ . Denote the probability that voters vote for the incumbent if he adopts policy A in both periods, 0 p , and the probability they vote for him if the policy is A in the first period and E in the second and the experiment succeeds, 1 In this setup, we can distinguish several types of experiment. We emphasize two distinctions. One kind of experiment has a relatively high cost of failure, F . One might think of deregulating electricity generation, where "failure" would result in widespread blackouts, or building a new kind of nuclear power plant, where "failure" could mean serious, long-lasting health risks to the population. We call such cases "high stakes experiments" . 10 Despite the high cost in the event of failure, high stakes experiments may often be worth doing: if the probability of failure is sufficiently low and the benefits of success sufficiently high, the expected value may be positive and large. More specifically, we say an experiment is a "high stakes" one if SF δ < .
If the incumbent implements a high stakes experiment in the first period and it fails, he has no chance of winning back the voters affected by implementing a successful experiment in the second. By contrast, if the incumbent implements a "low stakes" experiment in the first period ( SF δ ≥ ) and it fails, the incumbent can still get reelected if he implements a successful experiment in the second period. Examples of "low stakes" experiments might include increasing car registration fees to pay for road maintenance or investing in an advertising campaign to promote water conservation. Let p % be the probability that voters will vote for the incumbent if he implements a failed "low stakes" experiment in the first period but a successful experiment in the second. Clearly, 01
For a given set of payoffs to the voters for success or failure, a second distinction concerns the experiment's probability of success, q. From the incumbent government's perspective, what matters is the probability of experiments' success relative to the probability of 10 The term is slightly unfortunate in that what matters here is just the cost of failure rather than the payoff of success. We could not find another word that fits better. qpp < . Since all governments maximize reelection probabilities, the second period choices described here apply to both decentralization and centralization.
Under centralization, let {0,1,2,3} k ∈ be the number of localities in which the central government chooses experiments in the first period. Note that since experiments have the same payoffs and are independent, if the central government chooses more than one experiment in any period, it will choose different experiments in different localities. Its expected payoff, i.e., its probability of winning reelection in at least two localities, is given by Under centralization, the central government's expected payoff is given by Equation (1) . From Equation (1), the central government's expected payoff is 0.352, 0.4, 0.345, 0.216, when it chooses policy E in 0, 1, 2, or 3 localities, respectively. Thus the central government's optimal strategy is to choose policy E in one locality. In this case, the central government's reelection probability, 0.4, is greater than 0.3 q = , the reelection probability of an incumbent in any locality choosing policy E. Choosing policy E in one locality, the central government will get reelected with a probability of 0.3(1.60.64)0.288 ×−= if the experiment is successful. But the central government will also get reelected with a probability of 0.70.40.40.112 ××= even when the experiment fails, since it still has a chance of winning in the other two localities.
Proposition 1 shows that, contrary to the common view that decentralization is generally better at promoting policy experimentation, centralization leads to no less, and likely more, policy experimentation than decentralization when policy experiments are both high stakes and politically risky. While a case in which local governments conduct no policy experiments under decentralization may seem a little extreme, we demonstrate below that the main insight is quite general.
Politically promising experiments
When experimenting is sufficiently politically promising, 0 qp > , the following lemma presents the central government's optimal experimenting strategy. 
Extensions
We study here several extensions of the basic model, focusing on high stakes experiments in order to save space. Similar results also hold for low stakes experiments.
A large number of localities
Increasing the number of localities has two effects, both of which tend to produce greater experimentation under centralization. First, the risk-taking effect gets stronger. The central government needs only to win support of voters in a majority of localities. As the number of units increases, the importance of each to the center's winning coalition declines. The center will be more willing to risk failure in a number of localities in order to find successful policies that can be implemented in the others. By contrast, under decentralization each local government must win a majority within its own jurisdiction, and this does not change as the number of localities grows. Second, as the number of localities increases, the incentive for individual localities under decentralization to wait and free-ride on others' discoveries increases. This also reduces the motivation of individual localities to experiment. The probability of any given locality experimenting under decentralization goes to zero as n increases because each locality wants to free-ride on discoveries of others, and the free-rider problem becomes worse as the number of localities rises. The expected number of experiments under decentralization converges to a constant independent of n. But under centralization, the expected number of experiments increases with n without bound. Summarizing the discussion about both politically risky and promising experiments, we have the following conclusion.
Proposition 3. When the number of localities becomes sufficiently large, centralization leads to
more policy experimentation than decentralization.
Correlated experiments
In the basic model we assume that politicians choose from a large number of policy experiments, each of which has the same benefits if successful, costs if unsuccessful, and probability of success. We also assume that the results of all experiments are independent. But often these assumptions will not hold. We first examine what happens if the results of experiments are not independent. For instance, some types of experiment involve choosing different points on a scale.
Suppose the speed limit on highways is 65 miles per hour. One locality might reduce its speed limit to 55 miles per hour to see how this affects traffic accidents, another to 45 miles per hour, and so on. The results would likely be correlated, though less than perfectly.
To analyze correlated experiments, we consider the simplest case, in which there is only one available experiment. All localities that experiment implement this policy and have the same outcome. Furthermore, once any locality implements this policy in the first period, other localities that do not implement it in the first period will all implement it in the second period if it is successful and will all choose policy A otherwise. hold, all three localities choose to experiment under decentralization but only one is chosen to experiment under centralization. However, because of the perfect correlation, the probability of discovering a successful policy is the same under both systems. In other non-trivial cases, the central government chooses policy E in at least one locality under centralization, while the expected number of localities choosing policy E under decentralization is less than one.
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Therefore, in terms of promoting effective policy experimentation, the case for centralization is stronger than when experiments are independent because the probability of discovering a successful policy under centralization is always equal to or greater than that under decentralization. Similar conclusions should hold for highly, but imperfectly, correlated experiments.
When experiments are not perfectly correlated, centralization may have another benefit. 
Heterogeneous experiments
We now relax the assumption that all policy experiments have the same costs of failure, benefits of success, and probability of success. Suppose there is one policy experiment E 0 with success probability of q and many other experiments with success probability ofqq < (call these "lower-odds experiments"). All experiments are statistically independent.
Under decentralization, if any locality experiments in the first period, it will always choose E 0 because this strictly dominates choosing any other experiment. When 10 qpp ≤ , no locality will implement a lower-odds experiment in the second period if no successful experiments were implemented in the first. This means lower-odds experiments will never be implemented. The equilibrium outcome is exactly the same as if policy E 0 were the only experiment option; our analysis of perfectly correlated experiments in the preceding subsection applies here. In the pure strategy equilibrium, either zero, one, or three localities choose policy Thus, when experiments are heterogeneous, centralization will often do better than decentralization at stimulating the discovery of successful policies. Under decentralization, experiments with positive expected value may be neglected due to the coordination failure that leads all experimenting localities to choose the same experiment. Under centralization, the central government orders different experimenting localities to choose different policies to maximize the chance of success.
16 At the other extreme, if ˆ0 q → , then we are back to the case of perfectly correlated experiments.
Negative externalities
One of the main advantages of centralization is that it can internalize the positive informational externalities of localized experiments. But the externalities associated with local experiments can also be negative. Suppose that experiments impose costs not just on the experimenting locality but on its neighbors as well. For instance, local governments might reduce pollution controls to see if this attracts investment, or reduce welfare payments to the unemployed, prompting them to move. Clearly, a central government that internalizes such externalities will, for this reason, enact fewer of this type of experiment than local governments that can export such costs. Since the central incumbent must get votes in more than one locality, it will often care about the negative effects that cross local borders. Equally clearly, if the external costs of such experiments are high, preventing such experiments will increase social welfare, understood as the sum of the payoffs to the representative voters in each locality. 17 Central governments might also be more vulnerable to the pressures of national interest groups such as labor unions or business confederations. Such groups might favor uniform policies for their members nationwide. This also might lead central governments not to choose policies preferred by the local majorities in all cases. However, there is no clear reason why national interest groups in a decentralized system would not be able to lobby the individual local governments just as they lobby the central Although such "ideological spillovers" may be important, they may not imply a great innovation advantage for decentralization in practice. First, the institutions guaranteeing local autonomy must be quite robust to resist the pressure of national public opinion. Even in countries with very decentralized constitutions, central authorities and national judiciaries often intervene to overrule subnational governments whose policies conflict with preferences of the national majority. The US is among the most decentralized countries in the world. Its Supreme Court regularly uses the Commerce Clause, the 8 th Amendment, and Section 5 of the 14 th Amendment to invalidate state laws on various grounds, often explicitly rejecting the "states as laboratories"
argument-as, of course, the majority did in New State Ice Co. vs. Liebmann. To overturn state policies on grounds of "cruel and unusual punishment", the Court has explicitly invoked "evolving standards", based on its perception of nationwide public opinion. So ideological spillovers may restrain unpopular experiments even in decentralized states. Second, if a given experiment is ideologically opposed by the nationwide majority, the potential for it to spread, if successful, is limited. Were a US municipality able to experiment with legalizing heroin and found that drug overdoses fell, it seems doubtful that many other cities would follow. The type of experiment that centralization limits under this argument is precisely a type of experiment that will generate the smallest benefits nationwide. Representative Government: "The principal business of the central authority should be to give instruction, of the local authority to apply it. Power may be localized, but knowledge, to be most useful, must be centralized; there must be somewhere a focus at which all its scattered rays are collected, that the broken and coloured lights which exist elsewhere may find there what is necessary to complete and purify them" (Mill 1991, p.424) .
Collecting and disseminating information about local experiments may not be just a sense for local voters to evaluate their performance relative to that in neighboring localities (i.e.
using "yardstick competition"). 18 If so, then the local government under decentralization will have an incentive not to communicate details of its successful experiment because when other units implement the innovation this will erode the first government's relative performance. Under centralization, no such problem arises (unless the central government also uses yardstick competition to reward its agents and cannot order them to reveal details of policy.) Thus, the 18 See Shleifer (1985) , Besley and Case (1995 Another possible extension concerns heterogeneity not of policies but of localities.
Suppose that some localities are less risk averse than others. Or suppose that voters care not just about the "success" or "failure" of particular experiments, but about the policies themselves.
Voters in a "left-wing" locality might have a higher payoff from experimenting with universal health insurance-whether it succeeds or fails in saving money-than voters in a "right-wing" locality. By contrast, voters in a "right-wing" unit might have a higher payoff from experimenting with harsh criminal penalties than those in "left-wing" units. It is tempting to think this might lead to greater experimentation under decentralization, since the left-wing units could choose 
Q.E.D.

Proof of Lemma 2:
Let β be the probability each locality chooses policy E in the symmetric equilibrium. If (0,1) β ∈ , then policies A and E must yield the same expected payoff for an incumbent, so 
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3:
In the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium under decentralization, policies
A and E must yield the same expected payoff for an incumbent, so implement policy E should be unbounded as n →∞. Otherwise, suppose the bound is K <∞.
Then the probability of discovering a successful policy in the first period, π , is bounded from one. If a successful policy is discovered, the central government will win in almost every locality with probability 1 p . If not, then it will win in almost every locality with probability 0 p . However, if the central government implements policy E in a small fraction y of localities (hence an infinitely many as n →∞), then the probability of discovering a successful policy in the first period approaches one. It will win in all (1) yn − localities with probability 1 p . Clearly, by choosing a sufficiently small but positive y , the central government can be better off (sometimes strictly sometimes weakly). Therefore, the central government chooses to implement policy E in an unbounded number of localities as n →∞.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4:
If policy E is not implemented in the first period, it will be implemented in the second period if and only if 10 qpp ≥ . As before, let k be the number of localities that are chosen by the central government to experiment in the first period. Note that given perfect correlation, when 2 or 3 k = , the central government will win reelection if and only if the experiment turns out to be successful (which happens with probability q ). When 1 k = , it will need both non-experimenting localities to win if policy E fails, or at least one of them to win if policy E is successful. When 0 k = , the central government should choose policy E in all localities if 10 qpp ≥ , and policy A in all localities if 10 qpp < . In the former case, it will win reelection if and only if policy E is successful and it wins in at least two of three localities, which happens with probability (1)(2)(1)32(0) UkqppqpppUk ==−+−>−== when 0 p is relatively small (e.g., greater than but close to q ) and 1 p is relatively large. When that is the case, the central government will choose policy E in at least one locality in the first period.
In the case of politically promising experiments ( 0 pq ≤ ), it can be verified that under centralization, the central government will choose policy E in at least one localit y in the first period. 20 It will choose policy E in 2 or 3 localit ies in the first period if (1)(33)wp +−−+≤ % for a non-degenerate set of parameter values (e.g., relatively large 1 p and small q and p % ).
Q.E.D.
Proposition 6 shows that centralization promotes more experimentation than decentralization when policy experiments are low stakes but politically risky. Like Proposition 1, the free riding problem under decentralization and the risk-taking effect under centralization are the reasons behind Proposition 6. 
Politically promising experiments
